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Abstract 
 
This report discusses the ethicality of ExxonMobil’s actions when performing maintenance 
leading up to the Torrance refinery explosion in 2015. The Torrance refinery was ExxonMobil’s 
second smallest refinery that accounted for over 10% of the gasoline produced throughout 
California. In addition, this refinery was located in the center of a 150,000 person community, 
making safety in refinery processes critical in protecting the surrounding community. However, 
ExxonMobil implemented an unsafe, alternative procedure when performing maintenance on 
equipment that ultimately led to an explosion. After further investigation, it became evident that 
the refinery managers had ignored clear signs of danger and had used expired equipment, playing 
a significant role in the disaster. ExxonMobil violated three of Chevron Phillips’ 10 Tenets of 
Operation in the events leading up to the explosion. The company had hoped to maximize the 
production of gasoline and company profit when violating these tenets, but the opposite 
occurred. The violation of several tenets led to the injury of 4 refinery workers, a $566,000 fine 
from OSHA, a heavy hit to the company stock, and a heavy hit to gasoline prices throughout 
California. Furthermore, a toxic catalytic dust was released into the surrounding Torrance 
community that has unknown and potentially devastating, long-term side effects. If ExxonMobil 
had acted ethically in accordance with the 10 Tenets of Operation, then these problems could 
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ExxonMobil’s Toxic Torrance Refinery Failure, 2015 
Introduction 
On February 18th, 2015, ExxonMobil’s Torrance refinery managers and operators made a 
series of poor decisions surrounding equipment maintenance, which led to an explosion (DIR, 
2015). The explosion injured four contractors and released a toxic catalytic dust over the 
surrounding community and environment (DIR, 2015). By using out of date operating 
equipment, poorly addressing abnormal conditions, and ignoring countless signs of danger, 
ExxonMobil acted unethically and ultimately prioritized profit over safety. Chevron Phillips’ 10 
Tenets of Operation will be used as a basis for ethical behavior and they will be used in 
analyzing ExxonMobil’s unethical actions leading up to the refinery explosion.  
 ExxonMobil’s refinery in Torrance, California has been integral in the production of 
gasoline for California since the General Petroleum Company established the plant in 1928 
(CSB, 2017, p.8). Although the Torrance refinery was ExxonMobil’s second smallest refinery, it 
produced over five million gallons of gasoline per day, accounting for over ten percent of the 
total gasoline sold throughout California (CSB, 2017, p.8). This 750-acre refinery required 
nearly 1200 workers to operate at full capacity, and was located in the center of a 150,000-person 
community in Torrance, California as shown in Fig. 1 (CSB, 2017, p.9). In addition to gasoline, 
the refinery produced lesser volumes of diesel fuel and jet fuel, as well as sulfur and other 
chemicals (CSB, 2017, p.8).  
 The main steps of the refinery process and ExxonMobil’s changes to the process, causing 
the explosion, will be analyzed. This report will cover ExxonMobil’s unethical actions and how 
these actions resulted in the technical failures of the Torrance Refinery process. Then, using the 
10 Tenets of Operation, ExxonMobil’s actions will be critiqued to prove that Exxon acted 
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unethically in the Torrance refinery explosion. Finally, the impacts of the explosion will be 
further discussed to emphasize the importance of ethical action in refinery processes. However, 
not every component of the refinery process will be covered in this report, but rather, just the 
components of the refinery that played a role in the explosion. In addition, only the safety and 
monetary impacts of the explosion will be analyzed in this report, not governmental, societal, or 
any other overarching impact.  
 
 
Figure 1. ExxonMobil’s Torrance refinery is surrounded by a large community (CSB, 2017, p.9). 
The Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit 
 The Torrance refinery explosion occurred in the fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCC). The 
FCC unit breaks or “cracks” higher boiling point hydrocarbon molecules into smaller molecules, 
which is necessary for hydrocarbons to be used for fuel (CSB, 2017, p.10). At the end of the 
process, the FCC produces mainly light hydrocarbons and heavy naphtha, which are then further 
processed into gasoline (CSB, 2017, p.12). The FCC unit itself is divided by valves into two 
multicomponent sides: the air side and the hydrocarbon side as shown in Fig. 2 (CSB, 2017, 
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p.10). The hydrocarbon side contains the reactor, the main column, and a series of pumps. The 
air side contains the regenerator and the gas/catalyst separator, as well as the expander, boiler, 
and the electrostatic precipitator. Hydrocarbons should never enter the air side. 
 
Figure 2. Outline of the Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit, divided into the air side and the 
hydrocarbon side (CSB, 2017, p.10). 
The Catalyst Loop 
At the border between the two sides, a catalyst loop forms between the regenerator and 
reactor as shown in Fig. 3 (CSB, 2017, p.11). The small, spherical pellets of catalyst are aerated 
in this loop to ensure they flow throughout the whole system, rather than settling at the bottom of 
a unit (CSB, 2017, p.11). The heated and aerated catalyst leaves the regenerator and passes 
through the regenerated catalyst side valve (RCSV) into the reactor (CSB, 2017, p.12). After 
performing the reaction, the used or “spent” catalyst accumulates a thin coating of one of the 
solid byproducts from the reaction (CSB, 2017, p.12). Therefore, the spent catalyst must be sent 
through the spent catalyst side valve (SCSV) and back into the regenerator so the solid coating 
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can be burnt off, allowing the catalyst to be reused. In this burning process, combustion gasses 
are produced in the regenerator (CSB, 2017, p.13).  
 
Figure 3. Depiction of the catalyst loop between the regenerator and the reactor (CSB, 2017, 
p.11). 
Combustion Gas 
The combustion gas formed during the recycling of catalyst is treated within the FCC, as 
outlined in Fig. 4 (CSB, 2017, p.13). First, the gas is sent to the gas/catalyst separator which 
removes the majority of remaining catalytic dust in the gas (CSB, 2017, p.13). This cleaner gas is 
then sent through the expander, which uses the natural expansion of the gas to power the main air 
blower so catalyst can be aerated back in the catalyst loop (CSB, 2017, p.13). The combustion 
gas then enters the carbon monoxide boiler where leftover heat is removed. After removing 
leftover heat, the combustion gas is fed to the electrostatic precipitator (ESP) where spark-
producing charged plates remove any remaining catalytic dust (CSB, 2017, p.13). The gas, now 
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safe by California state regulations, can then safely enter the environment. 
 
Figure 4. Depiction of cleaning combustion gas process within the FCC unit (CSB, 2017, p.13). 
The Main Column 
Returning to the other side of the catalyst loop, the catalyst and uncracked hydrocarbons 
remain in the reactor, while the “cracked” or broken down hydrocarbons leave the reactor so they 
can be further separated in the main column (CSB, 2017, p.12).  In the main column, the 
hydrocarbon vapor is separated into its different forms by condensation as shown in Fig. 5 (CSB, 
2017, p.12). Heat is removed from the vapor in the column by pumping the vapor through pipes 
that surround other pieces of equipment within the FCC, transferring heat in the process. As the 
hydrocarbon vapor cools, it condenses into light hydrocarbons and heavy naphtha, cycle oil, and 
an oil slurry, the final products of the FCC process (CSB, 2017, p.12). 
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Figure 5. Depiction of the Main Column used to separate hydrocarbon vapor by condensation 
(CSB, 2017, p.12). 
Safe Park Mode 
Another integral aspect of the FCC unit is the “Safe Park” mode. Safe Park is a term used 
by ExxonMobil to define the status of a unit that has taken a series of automatic actions after 
sensors detect dangerous conditions. Safe Park mode does not fully shut down the system, but 
rather, the system is left in an emergency idle state where sections of the system remain in 
operation as shown in Fig. 6 (CSB, 2017, p.17). Although many sections shut down, the main 
column pumps remain energized, the ESP remains activated, and the hydrocarbons within the 
system remain in the unit (CSB, 2017, p.16). The disconnect between Safe Park and a full system 
shutdown results out of a desire to maximize profits. Leaving certain units within the system 
energized reduces restart time, minimizing gasoline loss. As a result of initiating Safe Park, the 
air side of the FCC no longer provides an air flow into the hydrocarbon side, so the backflow of 
hydrocarbons into the sparking ESP is an imminent danger. Therefore, the system enacts 
EXXONMOBIL TOXIC TORRANCE  11 	
automatic safety precautions, including the closure of the SCSV and the RCSV, which blocks 
any connection between the air side and hydrocarbon side. Additionally, the hydrocarbon feed as 
well as the main air blower stop, allowing the normally aerated catalyst in the regenerator to 
settle onto the closed RCSV and the normally aerated catalyst in the reactor to settle onto the 
closed SCSV (CSB, 2017, p.17). Ultimately, this action helps to further block the only two 
connection points between the two sides due to catalyst buildup on the valves. Finally, steam 
valves are opened to allow steam to flow in place of the halted hydrocarbon feed (CSB, 2017, 
p.17). The steam applies a constant pressure towards any remaining hydrocarbons to prevent 
backflow into the air side. In summary, the closure of the SCSV and RCSV and the catalyst build 
up on the valves provide physical barriers to prevent hydrocarbon backflow. Also, the constant 
pressure from the forward flowing steam helps to further aid this physical barrier. Essentially, 
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Figure 6. Depiction of Safe Park mode used in the Torrance Refinery, where specifics units 
cease operation (CSB, 2017, p.17). 
The Incident 
The FCC began to experience heavy vibrations due to an issue with the expander. 
Eventually, the vibrations grew so intense that the system automatically entered Safe Park mode. 
Due to a lack of space, the expander could not be isolated by the traditional methods 
ExxonMobil had formed for isolating sections of a unit (CSB, 2017, p.18). The management 
decided to follow a “variance” procedure approved and used in 2012 for a similar situation 
(CSB, 2017, p.19). After the variance procedure began, the reality of several dangers became 
apparent due to a steam leak. Rather than halting the process and conducting a safety analysis, 
the managers of the refinery pressed forward (CSB, 2017, p.19). As a result, the workers were 
only aware of the imminent danger minutes before the explosion occurred (CSB, 2017, p.21-22). 
 
The Vibrations 
EXXONMOBIL TOXIC TORRANCE  13 	
 The first sign of abnormality came with the FCC unit vibration. Operators expected this 
to be due to a buildup of solid catalyst on the expander blades, an issue that had been seen before 
in many similar plants (CSB, 2017, p.18). Because the combustion gas enters the expander 
before entering the ESP, small amounts of catalytic dust can often accumulate on the blades as 
the gas passes through the expander (CSB, 2017, p.16). The typical solution to this issue was to 
simply clean the blades of the expander, then the expander could continue to function normally. 
This time, however, vibrations reappeared less than a week after cleaning the expander blades, 
eventually rising to an even higher rate than the original vibrations (CSB, 2017, p.16). After the 
blades were cleaned a second time, no perceivable reduction of vibrations occurred. In the same 
day as this second cleaning, vibrations grew violent enough for the FCC unit to enter the “Safe 
Park” mode (CSB, 2017, p.16). 
At this point, management held a meeting to figure out the most efficient way to return 
the system to full operation. Per ExxonMobil’s company regulations, in order to perform 
maintenance on a section of a unit in Safe Park, the section had to be safely isolated from the 
process. Due to spatial constraints, it was found that the expander could not be isolated by 
ExxonMobil’s traditional process, which combined the “Double Block and Bleed” and blinding 
method (CSB, 2017, p.30). 
Isolation Methods and the Variance 
The Block and Bleed method involves the use of a block valve to stop the flow of process 
fluid to the piece of equipment that is to be isolated (CSB, 2017, p.26). Then, a bleed valve is 
placed between the block valve and the semi-isolated section to remove any remaining process 
fluid. Finally, a pressure gauge is added to ensure correct bleeding and to check for leaks (CSB, 
2017, p.26). When the block and bleed method is combined with blinding, “blinds” are placed at 
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the inlet and outlet of the isolated section as well. A blind is simply a disc of metal placed inside 
of the pipe to physically obstruct any process fluid from entering the isolated area (CSB, 2017, 
p.26). Claiming that space did not allow for the traditional isolation method of Double Block and 
Bleed with blinding, the managers decided to follow a “Variance” procedure performed in 2012, 
that called for a less strict isolation method. A diagram of the traditional Double Block and Bleed 
isolation method is displayed in Fig. 7 (CSB, 2017, p.26). 
 
Figure 7. Diagram of the Double Block and Bleed Method with blind installed (CSB, 2017, 
p.26). 
In 2012, a few years prior to the Torrance refinery explosion, ExxonMobil had a similar 
issue when the expander put the system into Safe Park mode. (CSB, 2017, p.29). The engineers 
working to solve the issue at the time had no desire to shut down the entire system for isolation 
because this would result in the loss of hydrocarbons to create gasoline. Instead, they designed 
and conducted a variant plan which avoided the Double Block and Bleed isolation method, and, 
instead, used a Single Block and Bleed method (CSB, 2017, p.29). This method eliminated the 
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installation of a blind at the inlet entirely as seen in Fig. 8 (CSB, 2017, p.26). In order to 
compensate for the absent second block and inlet blind, the variance added several necessary 
conditions: the SCSV and RCSV needed to be fully functioning and in a closed position, steam 
flow to the reactor had to be greater than 2,000 pounds per hour, and a blind must be installed at 
the expander outlet (CSB, 2017, p.30).  
 
 
Figure 8. Diagram of the Single Block and Bleed Method used by Variance (CSB, 2017, p.26). 
The Explosion 
The operators started the variance by opening a flange (a protruding rim where two 
sections of pipe connect) located at the outlet of the expander in order to install the blind that the 
variance procedure required. However, once the workers opened the flange, heavy amounts of 
steam began to pour out of the system (CSB, 2017, p.19). The workers were unable to get past 
the steam and install the blind. Additionally, the escaping steam indicated an important reality: 
steam was back-flowing through the system, so at least one of the two essential valves was not 
fully sealed. At this point, the variance was fully invalidated, as it required that both the SCSV 
and RCSV be properly closed (CSB, 2017, p.19). It would later be discovered that the SCSV was 
severely eroded due to its use past its normal operation life (CSB, 2017, p.25). Without full 
EXXONMOBIL TOXIC TORRANCE  16 	
sealing by the valve, the catalyst could not settle and buildup, eliminating one of the only two 
safeguards that prevented hydrocarbon backflow. This meant that the only remaining safeguard 
was the steam pressure driving the hydrocarbons back towards the main column. 
Rather than halting the variance procedure altogether, management decided to lower the 
effectivity of the only remaining safeguard (CSB, 2017, p.21). Steam flow was decreased from 
20,000 pounds per hour to 7,500 pounds per hour in hopes that it would lessen enough for the 
operators to reach the flange and install the blind (CSB, 2017, p.21). Although the minimum 
steam flow required by the variance was 2,000 pounds per hour, no records existed displaying 
how this number was found, and it proved to be far from what was actually needed (CSB, 2017, 
p.37-38). Shortly after reducing steam flow, hydrogen sulfide monitors began going off. 
Hydrogen sulfide was contained in the hydrocarbons, so this provided evidence that 
hydrocarbons were escaping out of the hydrocarbon side of the system (CSB, 2017, p.21). At this 
point, a refinery-wide evacuation occurred, and the steam was turned up to 35,000 pounds per 
hour. Unfortunately, the steam flow increase was ineffective, as hydrocarbons had already 
traveled through to the air side of the FCC unit. Eventually the vapors reached the ESP, igniting, 




Importance of Ethics and Criteria of Evaluation 
 Chevron Phillips’ 10 Tenets of Operation will be used in the analysis of the Torrance 
refinery explosion. The 10 Tenets of Operation, as seen in Fig. 9 (Chevron, n.d.), provide a solid 
framework for analyzing ethical behavior, specifically for large refinery processes. This is 
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because the tenets account for human error in operations in a more specific manner than a 
broader criteria such as the AIChE Code. Ultimately, a written code of ethics provides guidelines 
to keep safety paramount in importance for a company. ExxonMobil does have its own code of 
ethics, but Chevron Phillips’ tenets provide a more relevant basis for analysis of ethical behavior 
for the Torrance refinery explosion specifically. Therefore, the tenets can provide a better 
analysis of the refinery explosion because they can identify how individual actions in the refinery 
were unethical. Although ExxonMobil never directly agreed to the terms of Chevron Phillips’ 
Tenets of Operation, each of Chevron’s 10 tenets are fully supported by the AIChE Code, which 
applies to all companies engaging in chemical processes. The main tenets of this paper, one, two, 
and eight, are all supported by the first code of ethics in AIChE: “Hold paramount the safety, 
health and welfare of the public and protect the environment in performance of their professional 
duties” (AIChE, 2015). 
 
Figure 9. Chevron Phillips 10 Tenets of Operation (Chevron, n.d.). 
The Unethical Actions of ExxonMobil 
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First, ExxonMobil failed to act ethically by using out of date equipment that had 
deteriorated in quality. By using both out of date and generally unsafe equipment in the Torrance 
refinery, ExxonMobil violated Chevron Phillips’ First Tenet of Operation: “Always operate 
within design and environmental limits”(Chevron, n.d). Post-incident investigations showed that 
the Torrance refinery had an extremely eroded SCSV, preventing the catalyst buildup from 
playing its role as a physical barrier during Safe Park mode. After analyzing the SCSV erosion, it 
was apparent that the unit was in its sixth year of operation, two years past ExxonMobil’s 
expiration date for the piece (CSB, 2017, p.25). Additionally, the pipes surrounding the expander 
were never designed in a way for the expander to be isolated (CSB, 2017, p.29). Unfortunately, 
this did not stop the workers of the refinery from attempting to isolate the expander to avoid 
system shutdown. A lack of attention towards operating equipment within defined safety limits is 
an ethical failure according the Tenets of Operation (Chevron, n.d). 
ExxonMobil acted unethically a second time by forcing an under-researched “Variance” 
procedure that allowed fewer safety precautions, in hopes of increasing efficiency (CSB, 2017, 
p.25). This is a violation of Chevron Phillips’ 8th Tenet of Operation: “Always address abnormal 
conditions” (Chevron, n.d). Although some abnormal conditions were technically addressed, 
they were addressed poorly and quickly, and safety was treated as anything but paramount. 
ExxonMobil addressed the abnormal expander issues with a variant procedure to prevent the 
shutdown of the refinery. If any personnel had performed a simple safety analysis, the danger of 
a single block and bleed isolation method would have quickly surfaced. Chiefly, they would have 
discovered that the minimum steam flow called for by the variance was extremely low. It is 
likely that prioritizing the profit of the refinery over the safety of the people in Torrance was not 
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a conscious decision; however, the decision to lazily address abnormal conditions to keep the 
expander operating was likely a conscious decision that had harsh safety consequences. 
Finally, ExxonMobil failed to act ethically a third time by ignoring clear signs of danger 
when conducting the isolation maintenance. This is a violation of Chevron Phillips’ 2nd Tenet of 
Operation: “Always operate in a safe and controlled condition” (Chevron, n.d). When the flange 
was opened in order for the blind to be installed, steam came pouring out of the opened flange. 
This was a clear indication to the workers of the refinery that the SCSV had eroded enough to 
negate any physical catalyst barrier, and the true steam flow was unrelated to what indicators had 
read. At this point the flange should have been closed, steam should have been turned up, and 
variance should have been abandoned. Instead, the team decided to reduce the flow of steam in 
order to have greater access to the flange (CSB, 2017, p.20). Further worsening the assessment 
of the situation, the operators did not begin evacuation for nearly thirty minutes after clear signs 
of hydrocarbon backflow had been found. Around 8:10 AM, a supervisor working near the FCC 
was alerted by his hydrogen sulfide detector that unnatural levels of this chemical were in the air. 
This indicated that the gasses from the hydrocarbon side of the FCC were leaking through the air 
side, as hydrogen sulfide was contained in the FCC. It was not until 33 minutes later when 
evacuation of the area surrounding the FCC began (CSB, 2017, p.21-22). The delay in 
evacuation of the refinery workers ultimately created an even greater safety hazard, suggesting 
that their safety was not the top priority. 
Conclusion 
ExxonMobil acted unethically by prioritizing profit over the safety of the workers at the 
Torrance refinery. As one of the largest companies in one of the most profitable industries in the 
world, replacing out of date equipment is a negligible investment. Furthermore, shutting down a 
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single unit in ExxonMobil’s second smallest refinery would have been a very insignificant cost 
to ensure the safety of their workers and the people living in the surrounding Torrance 
community. However, because safety was second to profit, the company did not replace the 
equipment until irreversible damage was observed. With 70,000 employees, asking a small team 
to take time and perform a thorough safety analysis on a mysterious variance procedure would 
not be a mighty feat (CSB, 2017, p.57). Nevertheless, ExxonMobil decided, instead, to put full 
trust in a less safe variance procedure that had only been used once before. This irrational 
decision provides evidence that ExxonMobil’s focus was on producing gasoline for profit, not 
ensuring the safety of the refinery and surrounding environment. Finally, after placing 
themselves in an unsafe situation, ExxonMobil received one more chance to avoid major 
consequences. The steam leak of the newly opened flange clearly indicated to the operators and 
managers that the safety precautions they relied on had failed. Yet, ExxonMobil pressed on and 
continued to neglect safety, evacuating people only minutes before the explosion. 
Considering the repeated, clear signs of danger ignored by the workers of the Torrance 
refinery, several questions arise: What is the culture of ExxonMobil such that employees are 
afraid to halt production for safety? Has industry competition reached a level such that 
ExxonMobil feels the need to promote such a culture? What practical steps can be taken in order 
to prevent such work cultures from forming? These are the types of questions that must be 
answered for progress to be made within engineering ethics. 
Abiding by Chevron Phillips’ 10 Tenets of Operation most likely would have maximized 
not only safety, but profit as well for ExxonMobil’s Torrance refinery. The reality is that people 
get hurt when ethical codes are not strictly observed and enforced (Davis, 1991). In this case, 
four contractors were injured in the explosion. Additionally, toxic catalyst dust was released and 
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spread over the surrounding Torrance community, causing unknown long-term damages to 
people and the surrounding environment. Less intuitive, however, is the reality that ethics often 
saves more money long-term than cutting corners. ExxonMobil was fined $566,000 by OSHA 
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration) after the explosion for breaking several 
regulations related to the unethical actions stated earlier (Groom, 2015). The destruction of the 
FCC and surrounding units led to unmeasured loss of profits as repairs took place. Additionally, 
ExxonMobil later sold the entire plant, partially due to public pressures after the incident 
(Groom, 2015). The company’s stock plummeted, and California drivers cumulatively paid 
around $2.4 billion extra as gas prices spiked, marring the company’s public image (Groom, 
2015). Considering the harm to workers, the public, and the company as an entity, everyone 
benefits if Exxon abides by the 10 Tenets of Operation in the future. 
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